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Abstract
Introduction: Endotracheal intubation (ETI) has been considered an essential part of pre-hospital advanced life 
support. Pre-hospital ETI, however, is a complex intervention also for airway specialist like anaesthesiologists working 
as pre-hospital emergency physicians. We therefore wanted to investigate the quality of pre-hospital airway 
management by anaesthesiologists in severely traumatised patients and identify possible areas for improvement.
Method: We performed a risk assessment according to the predictive Bayesian approach, in a typical 
anaesthesiologist-manned Norwegian helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS). The main focus of the risk 
assessment was the event where a patient arrives in the emergency department without ETI despite a pre-hospital 
indication for it.
Results: In the risk assessment, we assigned a high probability (29%) for the event assessed, that a patient arrives 
without ETI despite a pre-hospital indication. However, several uncertainty factors in the risk assessment were 
identified related to data quality, indications for use of ETI, patient outcome and need for special training of ETI 
providers.
Conclusion: Our risk assessment indicated a high probability for trauma patients with an indication for pre-hospital ETI 
not receiving it in the studied HEMS. The uncertainty factors identified in the assessment should be further 
investigated to better understand the problem assessed and consequences for the patients. Better quality of pre-
hospital airway management data could contribute to a reduction of these uncertainties.
Introduction
Pre-hospital endotracheal intubation (ETI) has been con-
sidered the gold standard for airway protection and to
ensure oxygenation and controlled ventilation in severely
injured patients [1-3]. Despite this, studies on the clinical
impact of pre-hospital ETI are divergent in their conclu-
sions. Some studies indicate an increased survival related
to pre-hospital ETI [4,5], whereas others indicate the
opposite [6-8]. Several authors have claimed that pre-
hospital ETI is associated with poor quality and high
rates of complications that are more likely to kill than to
save the patient [9-13]. Securing the airway by ETI repre-
sents a complex intervention [14] consisting of several
critical factors and events. The poor quality and adverse
e v e n t s  m a y  b e  l i n k e d  t o  c h o i c e  o f  p r o c e d u r e  ( w i t h  o r
without drugs); lack of provider experience, training and
exposure; or insecure and complicated treatment envi-
ronments [15-17]. Despite high success rates with ETI
[18], even airway experts like anaesthesiologists in emer-
gency medical services (EMS) may face challenges when
managing the airway of traumatised patients outside the
hospital [19-21].
These challenges are closely related to quality of care
and need to be addressed and investigated beyond count-
ing complications and success rates.
Risk assessment methods are useful to investigate com-
plex systems and provide insight into risks, but also to
identify factors that influence risk to guide risk reducing
measures and improve quality [22]. Many regard predic-
tive risk assessments as especially well suited to health
care issues because of their ability to include human fac-
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tors in the assessment [22-24]. The novel predictive
Bayesian approach in particular has been advocated for
this use [22,25]. Still, the experience with the use of such
risk assessment methods in health care is limited. The
predictive Bayesian approach focuses on observable
quantities: the actual population and the knowledge
available [22,25]. Because this approach avoids the use of
fictional parameters, it is regarded as a simple predictive
risk assessment that is well suited for the study of health
care issues [22,25].
The aim of this study was to investigate the quality of
care in pre-hospital airway management by anaesthesiol-
ogists in patients with severe trauma and to identify pos-
sible areas for improvement. Specifically, we assessed the
risk of a trauma patient not receiving pre-hospital ETI
when there was an indication for ETI. The risk assess-
ment was performed in a typical Norwegian HEMS.
Methods
The risk assessment was performed according to the
principles of the predictive Bayesian approach [22,25,26].
Initially, we defined the adverse event of interest as
"Patient arriving in the emergency department (ED) with
an unsecured airway when the indication to secure it was
given pre-hospital", hereafter referred to as the "top
event". The focus of the risk assessment was to determine
the probability of the event and its consequences within
the system analysed, to reflect on the uncertainties
involved and to analyse the process leading to the event
and its consequences.
Fault tree
To analyse the causation leading to the event of interest,
we constructed a fault tree. Fault trees are logical descrip-
tions of the cumulative effects of faults within a system
that show cause and effect relations among basic or initi-
ating events that culminate in the adverse event of inter-
est [24,27].
Risk influencing factors
We then incorporated risk influencing factors into the
risk description to include human and organisational fac-
tors in the assessment. The risk influencing factors were
defined by three of the authors (SS, HML and AN), all
experienced HEMS physicians. We also gave the risk
influencing factors a score to reflect their quality and per-
formance in the system assessed. To simplify, we only
used three score levels: good, average and poor (Table 1).
This simplification is in line with previous work [28].
To calculate the probability of the top event in the anal-
ysed system based on the risk influencing factors, we first
agreed on a set of probabilities for the basic events in a
generic system. We assigned probabilities for three cases:
all risk influencing factors poor, all risk influencing fac-
tors average and all risk influencing factors good. Based
on these values, we then calculated the appropriate
"adjustment factor" needed in the analysis when the sta-
tus and weighted influence of the risk influencing factors
were taken into consideration. For this calculation, we
used the approach described by Aven [28], adjusted for
our purposes with only three score levels.
The risk influencing factors were then assigned their
appropriate scores within the system assessed by our
expert judgement, and the probability of the initiating
event was computed, given the assigned quality and per-
formance of the risk influencing factors.
The knowledge basis used for the assessment is found
in Table 2.
Consequence analysis
To analyse the consequences of the event, we constructed
an event tree. Event trees are logical structures that map
out the possible consequences of the event of interest and
the pathways leading up to the consequences [24]. It is
important to notice that event trees are based on the
assessors' interpretation of the causations leading up to
the possible outcomes. This implies that the assessor has
to make certain assumptions that need to be declared
when the event tree is presented. Two important assump-
tions were made in our case. Firstly, that time is an impor-
tant factor, meaning that delay in treatment impacts
outcome. This was however not visualized in the fault
tree. Secondly, the clinical state of the patient following
the traumatic injury was not taken into consideration
when estimating the outcomes, as this would make the
assessment to complex.
The possible consequences of the initiating event were
described based on the knowledge basis, our knowledge
of the system receiving the patients in the ED and the risk
analysis and are presented in a risk matrix, where we
defined four main categories with five different frequen-
cies/probability categories.
Uncertainty assessment and sensitivity analysis
In the uncertainty assessment, we identified uncertainty
f a c t o r s  t h a t  w e r e  j u d g ed  t o  h a v e  a n  i n fl u e n c e  o n  r i s k.
Uncertainty factors are related to the interpretation of
phenomena or assumptions made in the risk assessment
(based on the knowledge available) that can turn out to
be wrong in the future when better knowledge of the phe-
nomena is available [29]. Their importance with respect
to the effect on risk was categorised as minor, moderate
or major based on the description by Flage and Aven [29].
This categorisation was case-specific for the system
assessed and was based on the judgement of the assessor.
To further investigate the importance of these uncer-
tainty factors, we performed a sensitivity analysis where
we investigated how changing the assumptions or inter-S
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Table 1: The definitions of the possible states of the risk influencing factors (RIF).
RIF Possible states of RIFs
Poor Average Good
Culture and Attitudes - Does not adhere to current recommendations or guidelines for 
advanced pre-hospital airway management.
- Ignores good practice
- Relies only on own opinion of what is best practice
- Thinks that own skills are sufficient and that there is no need for 
practice outside clinical practice
- Not aware of or neglects use of protocol
- Overly confident in own ability to handle complications
- Does not believe that serious complications will occur
- Performs procedure for the benefit of the procedure, not to 
improve patient condition
- Does not believe in protocols
- No formal training of new providers
- Performed by an unsupervised, inexperienced provider
- Does not recognise experience and practise of other related 
services
- Do not acquire new knowledge on a regular basis
- No culture for feedback from receiving hospital
- Between good and poor - Adheres to current recommendations and guidelines for 
advanced pre-hospital airway management, uses them in 
daily practice.
- Has back-up from experienced provider
- Positive attitude towards use of protocol to improve 
procedure safety
- Prioritises patient safety
- Formal training program for new providers
- Takes preventive measures to avoid complications
- Learns from own experience and complications
 Individual
 Department
- Open learning environment
- Novice operators under direct supervision from 
experienced operator
- Interacts with other services to improve quality
- Has "system" of acquiring feedback from receiving 
hospitals
Providers experience and 
knowledge
- Not competent in advanced airway management
- Unfamiliar with difficult airway algorithm
- Has no strategy for checking the patency of the airway after the 
procedure
- Is not up to date on current recommendations and guidelines 
for advanced pre-hospital airway management
- No defined relevant role model for own activity
- Focus on own standing and career rather than patient outcome
- Random assistant during airway procedures
- Competent in advanced airway 
management
- Knows difficult airway algorithm
- Checks patency of the airway at 
regular intervals
- Has limited knowledge of current 
recommendations and guidelines for 
advanced pre-hospital airway 
management
- Has trained assistant (that is 
integrated in the crew) for airway 
procedures, but makes irregular use of 
assistance
- Competent in advanced airway management
- Competent in difficult airway management
- Familiar with local back-up airway equipment
- Familiar with potential airway complications in the pre-
hospital setting and the handling of these
- Monitors the patency of the airway after the procedure
- Knows the current recommendations and guidelines for 
advanced pre-hospital airway management, especially 
the use of tracheal intubation.
- Uses trained assistant (that is integrated in the crew) 
during airway proceduresS
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System - System has no policy on hiring providers experienced in pre-
hospital medicine
- Most providers are inexperienced in pre-hospital medicine or 
are in-training
- There is no system for training or retraining the providers in 
advanced airway management
- No system for quality assurance
- No formal R&D activities
- Techniques and equipment used for advanced airway 
management is not up to date with current standards
- System hires mostly providers 
experienced in pre-hospital medicine 
or specialists within their field
- The providers are trained in some of 
the skills and procedures related to 
advanced airway management at 
regular interval or all procedures at 
irregular intervals
- System hires only providers experienced in pre-hospital 
medicine and specialists within their field
- All providers are trained and retrained regularly in all 
skills and procedures related to advanced airway 
management, including rescue techniques
- Techniques and equipment used in advanced airway 
management are up to date with current standards
- Service registers activity data from advanced airway 
management and uses data for quality improvement and 
research
Protocol compliance - No protocol available or available protocol is not followed
- Protocol do not match provider competence
- Protocol available, but does not give 
a clear framework for the procedure 
(see "good")
- Partially follows protocol
- Protocol for advanced pre-hospital airway management 
exists.
- Protocol defines framework for the procedure
- Protocol defines measures to improve quality and safety 
of procedure
- Protocol defines team roles
- Protocol is followed in all cases
- Protocol is regularly updated to comply with current 
knowledge
Table 1: The definitions of the possible states of the risk influencing factors (RIF). (Continued)Sollid et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency
Medicine 2010, 18:22
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pretations made in the risk analysis would influence the
result of the risk analysis. If changing them was found to
be important for the risk indices (probabilities of adverse
events and consequences) under consideration, it was
assigned a high sensitivity; conversely, it was assigned a
low sensitivity if changes had little or no influence on the
risk indices [29]. Uncertainty factors subject to large
uncertainties that would also change the risk indices by
even a small amount were regarded as having a signifi-
cant effect on risk. These uncertainty factors should be
subjected to further investigation to increase the knowl-
edge of the phenomena.
Results
In this study we identified four basic events leading up to
the main event, thus constructing a fault tree as shown in
Figure 1. Based on our evaluation, we decided that all risk
influencing factors influenced all basic events, but that
the weighted influence was different for each basic event.
Figure 2 shows a simple influence diagram demonstrating
the influence of the risk influencing factors on the basic
events. Based on our knowledge and judgement of the
system analysed we assigned the following scores for the
risk influencing factors:
- Culture and attitudes: average
- System: poor
- Providers' experience and knowledge: average
- Protocol compliance: poor
With the assigned risk influencing factor basis, we cal-
culated the probability of the top event at 29%, meaning
that we would expect the event to take place in 29 of 100
cases if we were to observe the system today. The event
tree constructed for the consequence analysis is pre-
sented in Figure 3. In the consequence analysis we found
the probability of "no harm" and "possible sequela with
prolonged hospital stay" to be almost equal (Figure 4)
given the event where the patient arrives in the ED with-
out a secured airway when the indication for ETI was
given pre-hospital. The consequence "possible sequelae
with a prolonged hospital stay" was assigned a probability
of at least 10-50% during one year, but less than 1-10 inci-
dents occurring during one year (Figure 4). The probabil-
Table 2: Knowledge basis for the risk assessment
i) A review of the literature on outcomes of pre-hospital 
advanced airway management (unpublished), 
including a recent Cochrane review on the same topic 
[30].
ii) A recent survey of Norwegian helicopter emergency 
medical service (HEMS) physicians' own perceptions 
of the safety and quality of pre-hospital airway 
management in their system [19].
iii) Audit of data from patients with severe traumatic 
injury treated by the assessed HEMS systems in the 
1994 -- 2005 period (unpublished data, manuscript in 
preparation).
iv) Expert judgement by three of the authors (SS, HML 
and ARN) as experienced HEMS physicians and one 
independent HEMS physician from the system 
assessed.
v) The literature cited in this study.
Figure 1 Fault tree visualising the process leading up to the top 
event.
Figure 2 Influence diagram illustrating the impact of the risk in-
fluencing factors on the basic events of the fault tree. The impact 
is shown as normalized weights, meaning that the sum of impacts on 
each basic event is 1.0 and the impact of each risk influencing factor 
represents a fraction of this.Sollid et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency
Medicine 2010, 18:22
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Figure 3 Event tree visualising the possible outcomes of the event being assessed.Sollid et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency
Medicine 2010, 18:22
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ity of death following the event was assigned as less than
1% during one year (Figure 4).
Uncertainty factors identified in the uncertainty assess-
ment are listed in Table 3. In the sensitivity analysis, we
found none of the uncertainty factors to have significant
sensitivity, but all factors regarding the system and cul-
ture and attitudes were assigned a potentially moderate
significance, meaning that changing the factors would
somewhat change the risk indices too.
Discussion
In our risk assessment of the typical Norwegian anaesthe-
siologist-manned HEMS, we found that the probability of
a patient arriving in the hospital without ETI when there
was a pre-hospital indication for it was as high as 29%.
Most studies on pre-hospital advanced airway manage-
ment report on complication- or success rates and are
either retrospective [30,31] or prospective observational
studies [12,32-35]. In both cases they only present the
incidence of complications or successful ETI in the sys-
tem where the data was collected at the time of collec-
tion. The transferability of the results to other systems or
even to the same system may be questionable as other
factors influence practice in other systems, and systems
may change. Predictive risk assessments like the predic-
tive Bayesian approach may provide a more correct pic-
Figure 4 Risk matrix with possible consequences of the event that a patient arrives in the emergency department without endotracheal 
intubation, when there was an indication for endotracheal intubation pre-hospital. The figures indicate the assigned probabilities for the out-
comes.
   
Consequences 
Frequencies/ 
probabilities 
No Harm 
Possible sequela – 
prolonged hospital 
stay 
Sequela highly 
probable – 
prolonged hospital 
stay 
Death 
Prediction of more 
than 10 incidences 
during one year 
 
   
Prediction of 1- 10 
incidences during one 
year 
 
 
  
10-50 % probability 
of an incidence during 
one year 
    
1-10 % probability of 
an incidence during a 
year 
  
  
< 1 % probability of 
an incidence during a 
year 
    
Table 3: Uncertainty factors identified in the uncertainty assessment
Effect on risk
Uncertainty factor Minor Moderate Major
Amount of training needed to maintain 
airway skills
x
Need for special training in pre-hospital 
airway management
x
Impact of patient's condition on 
consequences
x
Reliability of data recorded in patient charts x
Criteria used to decide whether or not 
patient should be intubated
xSollid et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency
Medicine 2010, 18:22
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ture of the problem today because it uses a broader
knowledge basis (qualitative and quantitative data, and
expert judgement) to assess the problem - or rather the
risk - as it is today [22,25,26]. It is also tailored for the sys-
tem being assessed in that it uses system specific or -rele-
vant knowledge in the risk assessment [25]. This means
that the risk indices assigned in the risk assessment of our
top event expresses what we expect the risk to be today in
the system assessed.
The predictive Bayesian approach is not only useful for
describing a risk picture, it also provides us with a tool to
visualise and analyse the causes leading up to the event of
interest and to identify where improvements are needed
and would have the greatest effect. From a patient safety
perspective, this is essential: we often know there is a
problem, but we do not have a sufficient understanding of
the mechanisms causing the problem. Besides the initiat-
ing events in the fault tree, the risk influencing factors
provide a good indication of where measures to influence
the risk have impact. By changing the values of the
assigned probabilities for the basic events in the fault
tree, we can for example get an impression of where risk-
r educing measures ha ve t he grea test im pact. If all risk
influencing factors in our case were scored as good, the
probability of the top event could be reduced to 3%, or
with all risk influencing factors scored as average, to 17%.
Changing the system and culture and attitudes risk influ-
encing factors to a level where they would be scored as
good would change the assigned probability of the top
event to 14%, whereas optimising only the providers'
competence risk influencing factor to the level where it
would be scored as good would lead to an assigned prob-
ability of 24%. This implies that risk-reducing measures
in our system should focus on system and culture and
attitudes.
To establish which aspects of these risk influencing fac-
tors that need improvement, we think a key task would be
to establish why the physician in charge decides to refrain
from securing the airway pre-hospital. In our audit of the
HEMS studied (unpublished data, manuscript in prepara-
tion), which was part of the knowledge basis for the risk
assessment, some physicians have commented that they
abstained from pre-hospital ETI because of a short trans-
port distance. The same data show that transport time
was lower in the group that was intubated in the ED com-
pared to those intubated pre-hospital. Further, the audit
data indicate that the patients intubated pre-hospital
were more severely injured than those intubated in the
ED because of lower RTSs and GCSs. This might explain-
ing why ETI was postponed in some cases: short trans-
port distance and less serious injury. Still, the patients
were intubated immediately upon arrival in the ED, indi-
cating that there was a need to secure the airway. This
raises the question of whether the postponed ETI had any
impact on the patients' condition. A recent study from
the Netherlands [36] showed a failure to adhere to guide-
lines for pre-hospital ETI in traumatic brain injury in
almost half of the studied population. Further, the authors
found a negative influence on respiratory and metabolic
parameters in patients not intubated [36]. Other studies
have also shown that poor oxygenation and ventilation
may worsen outcome [37-39]. If we assert that hypoxia
and hypoventilation is more likely to occur in a non-intu-
bated patient, then to abstain from ETI to reduce scene to
door time has the potential to harm the patient. The find-
ings of a recent study also indicate that delayed treatment
of critically injured patients until arrival in the trauma
centre worsens outcome [40]. The potential effect of
d e l a y e d  t r e a t m e n t ,  i n  o u r  c a s e  E T I ,  w a s  r e g a r d e d  a s
important in the consequence analysis of our top event
and was one of the reasons why we assigned a high prob-
ability of possible sequela and delayed hospital stay fol-
lowing the top event. Because we did not take the
patients condition following the injury into account in the
consequence analysis, we assigned the impact of the
patient's condition on consequences to be an uncertainty
factor with major effect on risk.
As the uncertainty analysis revealed there are other
important uncertainty factors that influence the analysis
at this point. Because we have little knowledge about why
the physicians decided not to intubate in some cases the
criteria used for deciding to intubate or not was assigned
as an uncertainty factor. The quality of the audit data
used in the assessment was also difficult to assess. For the
purpose of the risk assessment we assumed that the qual-
ity of the data recorded in the patient charts would be
good, but observed that the completeness of the records
was variable. The reliability of the data was therefore
assigned to have major effect on risk. Reliable and better
quality data would obviously reduce both these uncer-
tainties. For this purpose initiatives like the recent
Utstein style template for registering data following pre-
hospital airway management are important [41].
This risk assessment was performed for the Stavanger
HEMS based on our knowledge of and experience with
the system. The probabilities were assigned by the asses-
sor as an expression of the assessor's uncertainty about
the occurrence of the top event [22,25,26]. These proba-
bilities are not estimates or predictions of some true value
that is thought to exist, as they are often presented in
classical risk assessment [22,25,26]. As such, they are sub-
jective and conditional on the knowledge available about
the system being assessed and the assessor's interpreta-
tion of this knowledge. Compared to traditional medical
science, a risk assessment conducted according to the
predictive Bayesian approach might seem like an exercise
in subjective interpretation of data that is prone to asses-
sor bias. Admittedly, this kind of risk assessment is heav-Sollid et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency
Medicine 2010, 18:22
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ily based on the assessors' own judgement, but the
assessment process is methodical and traceable. The risk
assessment does not attempt to present "truths" or "evi-
dence", but rather focuses on what we can interpret from
the knowledge available and what limitations, or rather
what uncertainties, there are in the assessment. It is
therefore important to declare and assess the uncertainty
factors in the analysis. Triangulation is a term used in
land surveying to determine the position of an object; by
drawing a line to the object from at least three different
observation points, the object's exact position can be
determined. The same term is used to describe the
method of analysing a problem using different sources of
information and data and from different viewpoints in
qualitative research to develop an overall interpretation
[42] and is also, in our opinion, a valid analogy for assess-
ments like the predictive Bayesian approach. In our case
the knowledge basis illustrates the points of triangulation.
We believe this to be the most important contribution of
the predictive Bayesian approach to risk management in
general and in particular to risk management in health
care.
Although the risk assessment was limited to one spe-
cific Norwegian HEMS, we think the concerns raised may
apply to other similar systems. Providing the best quality
of care to seriously injured patients can be challenging
and as our risk assessment indicates, the decision on
when to perform ETI or not may be influenced by many
factors. The predictive Bayesian approach provides a tool
to perform the same risk assessment in other HEMS sys-
tems, provided the appropriate background knowledge
from the specific system studied is used.
Conclusion
Our risk assessment of a typical Norwegian HEMS indi-
cated a high probability of the event in which a severely
traumatised patient arrives in the hospital without ETI
despite a pre-hospital indication for it. The consequence
analysis also indicates a high probability of sequela for the
patient following this event. There are, however, impor-
tant uncertainty factors related to this assessment that
need to be further investigated to improve our under-
standing of the event studied. We think better quality of
pre-hospital airway management data would contribute
to reduce these uncertainties.
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